[ALAC] Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

Alan Greenberg alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Mon Nov 9 18:07:12 UTC 2015


This is a new proposal by Brazil to replace the 
current Bylaw change to address Stress Test 18. 
It re-instates the requirement that the Board 
reject GAC advice by a supermajority, one of the 
ATRT outcomes that was proposed several months 
ago. At that time, there was significant push 
back that increasing the rejection threshhold 
increased the power of the Board.  Although 
possible technically correct, in my mind, it 
would not make a difference, because rejection of 
GAC advice, in the relatively rare times it has 
happened, has been nearly or completely unanimous.

This is now accompanied by a much stronger 
requirement to consider the advice of all ACs including the ALAC.

This may well be a way to bypass the GAC's 
rejection of the ST18 outcomes and at first glance, I would support it.

Comments?

Alan


>To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org"
>         <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 14:28:46 +0000
>Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
>Dear CCWG colleagues,
>
>As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has provided 
>a consensus input with regards to the bylaw 
>amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the following:
>
>"The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped 
>the GAC to have a better understanding of the 
>different views on the issue. In assessing the 
>different rationales presented so far related to 
>Stress Test 18, the GAC considered:
>    * The need that each and every Advisory 
> Committee ensures that the advice provided is 
> clear and reflects the consensus view of the Committee;
>    * The need that each and every Advisory 
> Committee should preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus;
>    * The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice;
>    * The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as 
> reiterated by the ATRT2, to set the threshold 
> for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 
> 2/3 majority voting, consistent with the 
> threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations.
>
>In view of the above, having considered concerns 
>expressed by various parties, the GAC agreed to 
>further work on the issue of Stress Test 18, and 
>to submit any further input to the CCWG taking 
>into account the timelines of the CCWG. GAC 
>Members will continue to work within the CCWG to 
>finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability."
>
>With the aim of addressing the input given by 
>the GAC in its ICANN 54 communiqué and the 
>original concerns expressed by the ST18 
>proponents, I present for your consideration the 
>following alternative amendments (underlined) in ICANN bylaws.
>
>ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>Section 1. GENERAL
>“The Board may create one or more Advisory 
>Committees in addition to those set forth in 
>this Article. Advisory Committee membership may 
>consist of Directors only, Directors and 
>non-directors, or non-directors only, and may 
>also include non-voting or alternate members. 
>Advisory Committees shall have no legal 
>authority to act for ICANN, but shall report 
>their findings and recommendations to the Board.
>Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due 
>deference to advice from Advisory Committees and 
>where that advice, if not followed, requires 
>finding mutually agreed solutions for 
>implementation of that advice, the Advisory 
>Committee will make every effort to ensure that 
>the advice provided is clear and reflects the 
>consensus view of the committee. In this 
>context, each Advisory Committee has the right 
>to determine its particular definition of consensus.”
>
>ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>Item 1.j
>“The advice of the Governmental Advisory 
>Committee on public policy matters shall be duly 
>taken into account, both in the formulation and 
>adoption of policies. In the event that the 
>ICANN Board determines to take an action that is 
>not consistent with the Governmental Advisory 
>Committee advice, it shall so inform the 
>Committee and state the reasons why it decided 
>not to follow that advice. Any GAC Advice 
>approved by a GAC consensus may only be rejected 
>by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the 
>Board. The Governmental Advisory Committee and 
>the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and 
>in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.”
>
>Kind regards,
>
>Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
>Divisão da Sociedade da Informação
>Ministério das Relações Exteriores
>T: +55 61 2030-6609
>
>_______________________________________________
>Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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