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This is a new proposal by Brazil to replace the current Bylaw change to
address Stress Test 18. It re-instates the requirement that the Board
reject GAC advice by a supermajority, one of the ATRT outcomes that was
proposed several months ago. At that time, there was significant push
back that increasing the rejection threshhold increased the power of the
Board. Although possible technically correct, in my mind, it would
not make a difference, because rejection of GAC advice, in the relatively
rare times it has happened, has been nearly or completely
unanimous.<br><br>
This is now accompanied by a much stronger requirement to consider the
advice of all ACs including the ALAC.<br><br>
This may well be a way to bypass the GAC's rejection of the ST18 outcomes
and at first glance, I would support it.<br><br>
Comments?<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">To:
"accountability-cross-community@icann.org"<br>
<x-tab> </x-tab>
<accountability-cross-community@icann.org><br>
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 14:28:46 +0000<br>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion<br><br>
Dear CCWG colleagues, <br><br>
<font face="Calibri" size=2>As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has
provided a consensus input with regards to the bylaw amendments derived
from ST18. The GAC input was the following:<br><br>
</font>"<i>The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to
have a better understanding of the different views on the issue. In
assessing the different rationales presented so far related to Stress
Test 18, the GAC considered: </i>
<ul>
<li><i>The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that the
advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the
Committee;
<li>The need that each and every Advisory Committee should preserve its
own autonomy in its definition of consensus;
<li>The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice;
<li>The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to set
the threshold for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority
voting, consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO
and GNSO PDP recommendations.</i>
</ul><br>
<i>In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by various
parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress Test 18,
and to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account the
timelines of the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the CCWG
to finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability.</i>"
<br>
<font face="Calibri" size=2><br>
</font>With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN
54 communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18 proponents,
I present for your consideration the following alternative amendments
(<b><u>underlined</u></b>) in ICANN bylaws. <br>
<font face="Calibri" size=2> </font> <br>
<font face="Calibri" size=4><i>ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES<br>
<b>Section 1. GENERAL<br>
</b>“The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to
those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may
consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors
only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory
Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall
report their findings and recommendations to the Board.<br>
<b><u>Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice
from Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires
finding mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the
Advisory Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice
provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In
this context, each Advisory Committee has the right to determine its
particular definition of consensus.</b>” <br>
</u> <br>
ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES<br>
<b>Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES<br>
Item 1.j<br>
</b>“The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy
matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and
adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to
take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory
Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons
why it decided not to follow that advice. <b><u>Any GAC Advice approved
by a GAC consensus may only be rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds
(2/3) of the Board.</u></b> The Governmental Advisory Committee and the
ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient
manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.”<br><br>
</i></font>Kind regards,<br>
<font face="Calibri" size=2><br>
Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva<br>
Divisão da Sociedade da Informação<br>
Ministério das Relações Exteriores<br>
T: +55 61 2030-6609<br>
</font><font face="Calibri" size=4><i><br>
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