[ALAC] ALAC MEMBERS: Consensus Call on ALAC Advice to the ICANN Board on New gTLD Contention Resolution closing 21 June at 23:59 UTC

[ICANN At-Large Staff]

Dear All,

On behalf of Jonathan Zuck, ALAC Chair, this is a three-day Consensus call for the 15 members of the ALAC on the ALAC Advice to the ICANN Board on New gTLD Contention Resolution.

The Consensus call will close on Friday, 21 June at 23:59 UTC.

Please let us know if you have any significant comments or concerns on the ALAC Advice.

**

At-Large Advisory Committee Advice to the ICANN Board on New gTLD Contention Resolution



In her 3 June 2024 Blog <https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/board-discusses-auctions-of-last-resort-private-resolution-of-contention-sets-03-06-2024-en>, the ICANN Board Chair reiterated that “the Board is not inclined to sanction a repeat of the 2012 process when private resolutions were encouraged in the Applicant Guidebook.”



The ALAC strongly supports this statement by the ICANN Board Chair.



The ALAC agrees with the National Economic Research Associates (NERA) which said in its report of 17 May 2024 <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/addressing-monetary-means-private-resolution-final-report-17may24-en.pdf> that attempting to eliminate private auctions or comparable monetary resolutions while allowing legitimate post-application “joint ventures” would be difficult or impossible, and its conclusion that a ban on private resolutions would have to include all forms, including joint ventures. While also noting the lack of such post-application joint ventures being formed to as a means to resolve contention sets in the 2012 round, the ALAC now reiterates and expands upon its previous advice.



The ALAC advises the ICANN Board to ban all forms of post-application private resolution of contention sets, including joint-ventures regardless of claims as good-faith joint ventures.



Furthermore, the ALAC advises the ICANN Board to adjust the ICANN Auction of Last Resort to an auction process a methodology comparable to a Vickrey Auction (sealed-bid second-price auction - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction [en.wikipedia.org]<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction__;!!PtGJab4!5_mw9p8LH53CKdy0Qa_hrpCzu8E1QHSvqcPQXg2ciD8heLDDYij8iwoB84wIWYX3tF4wmVe1bIwygRGX6pzj3IQ97DuyOttfCiK2HA$>) requiring each gTLD string application to be accompanied by an auction bid at the time the application is submitted, and prior to any indication of possible contention sets being formed.



Firstly, requiring an applicant to submit an accompanying auction bid with its application - and if more than one application, a bid with each of its applications - helps the applicant demonstrate the bona fide intention of operating a TLD that it affirmatively attests to.



Secondly, Vickrey auctions mitigate, if not eliminate, any ability to abuse or game the application process since bids are submitted prior to knowing if there are any competitors and who they may be.



Thirdly, ICANN may be able to capitalize on opportunities to reduce application evaluation costs, for both ICANN org and applicants, in cases where there are multiple contenders for the same string, by strategically positioning the ICANN Auction as a process of elimination earlier in the evaluation cycle, rather than as a contention set resolution mechanism of last resort, thereby foregoing the need for evaluation processes which can reasonably be avoided. However, this consideration must not displace the option for Community Priority Evaluation (CPE) by Community-based TLD applicants that opts for the CPE in an attempt to prevail out of a contention set.



In other words, the ALAC supports the overall intention of the Subsequent Procedures Recommendation 35.4 which the GNSO Council chose not to submit to the ICANN Board for adoption, EXCEPT FOR (a) the provision allowing participation in various forms of private resolution; (b) the allowance for applicants whose applications that are caught or are added to any contention sets that are expanded as a result of other application procedures to as a result of other application procedures; and (c) the provision that ICANN Auctions would only take place after all the other evaluation procedures, and objections are completed.



The ALAC would be pleased to enter into further dialogue with the Board on any of these issues.
**

Kind regards,

At-Large Staff
ICANN Policy Staff in support of the At-Large Community
Website: atlarge.icann.org<https://atlarge.icann.org/>
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