[At-Large] - Price caps - was: The Case for Regulatory Capture at ICANN | Review Signal Blog

Karl Auerbach karl at cavebear.com
Mon Jul 1 20:12:29 UTC 2019

On 7/1/19 12:36 PM, Roberto Gaetano wrote
> So, in short, how can ICANN get rid od the supposedly failing multi-stakeholder model and go back to what Paul R. Letho defines “democracy”?
> Or, in simple words, how would a non-multi-stakeholder model be designed and implemented for ICANN?

That's pretty easy: Resurrect the system of nominations and elections 
from year 2000 (but expanded to cover the entire board-of-directors.)  
Despite the denials of some, that system worked.  Yes, there were 
problems with the registration - including several caused by ICANN 
itself.  But that could have been cured on subsequent rounds.

The claim that in some regions (most particularly Asia/Pacific) that 
some large corporations "motivated" their employees probably had some 
truth.  But absent those elections those corporations in a "stakeholder" 
(or lobbyist) system most likely would have simply acted through the 
more certain and direct tool of those captive lobbyist/stakeholders than 
through the less certain tool of trying to influence individual electors.

Influence by those with size and wealth so that they can engage in any 
forum at any time and at any location will always be a problem, no 
matter the system.

In addition, to elections themselves, ICANN should put into place the 
protections afforded by law to allow the voting members to get the 
information they need to make informed choices and to take certain 
limited actions in certain extraordinary circumstances. The protections 
are not unreasonable; they have been honed on the stone of long practice 
and experience with ICANN-like organizations.

This change would a representative system, not a direct one - the real 
authority (and responsibility) between elections would remain where it 
ought to be (and legally is): vested in the board of directors.  At the 
next election the voters can replace those directors who fail to meet 
the voters' standards or whose pattern of decisions is not in accord 
with their desires.

Lobbyists would have to convince voters or convince the board members 
(hopefully via open and transparent means.)

By-the-way, in that sense, we are all lobbyists for our own interests.  
But as individuals we are all lobbyists of roughly the same size.  We 
can't say the same about institutional lobbyists/stakeholders who are 
paid to advocate for the institutional goals 24x7x365.  Better a system 
based on rough equality than a system that naively presumes that giants 
don't have greater strength.


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