[At-Large] FRIENDLY REMINDER: Review on Trusted Community Representation #Root #Zone #DNSSEC [Call for Comments]

Salanieta T. Tamanikaiwaimaro salanieta.tamanikaiwaimaro at gmail.com
Fri Feb 7 12:35:42 UTC 2014

Dear All,

Many thanks for your contributions on the Wiki and in the mailing list.
This is a revised Draft:

For those who wish to make final last minute comments, visit:

Since there were divergent views on some of the issues, I have attempted to
capture both views.

*Revised Draft ALAC Statement on the TCR Review*


The Affirmation of
the Internet as a transformative technology that empowers people around the
globe, spurs innovation, facilitates trade and commerce, and enables the
free and unfettered flow of
One of the elements of the Internet's success is a highly decentralized
network that enables and encourages decision-making at a local level.
Notwithstanding this decentralization, global technical coordination of the
Internet's underlying infrastructure - the Domain Name
(DNS) -
is required to ensure

DNS Security Extensions[4]<file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Administrator/My%20Documents/ICANN/Draft%20ALAC%20Statement%20on%20Review%20of%20TCR%20Model.docx#_ftn4>
is a protocol that is currently being deployed to secure the Domain Name
System (DNS), the Internet's global phone book. DNSSEC adds security to the
DNS by incorporating public key cryptography into the DNS hierarchy,
resulting in a single, open, global Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for
domain names.

In DNSSEC a secure response to a query is one which is cryptographically
signed and validated. An individual signature is validated by following a
chain of signatures to a key which is trusted for some extra-protocol
reason. ICANN, as IANA Functions Operator, is responsible for the
publication of trust anchors
the root zone of the Domain Name System.

Since July 2010, the DNS Root Zone has been secured using DNSSEC. The model
of using DNSSEC in the DNS Root Zone revolves around a "key signing key"
(KSK) that is managed by ICANN in two secure facilities. Four times a year,
a ceremony is conducted at these facilities to perform operations involving
the KSK. As a key part of this process, a minimum of three from a pool of
21 trusted community representatives (TCRs) attend each ceremony to enable
access to the secure materials, to witness the procedure, and to attest
that the ceremony was conducted properly.


The At Large Community recognizes the role and significance that the DNS
plays in ensuring interoperability. We recognize the importance of DNSSEC
in the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet in the root zone
and the subsequent deployment in DNS Infrastructure. Noting that at the
time this statement was written there were 427 TLDs in the root zone of
which 235 are signed and that 229 have trust anchors published in the DS
records in the root zone whilst 4 TLDs have trust anchors published in the
ISC DLV Repository <http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/>, we
hope that in time more TLDs will move towards having trust anchors

 The Root Zone Key Signing Ceremony points to one of ICANN's important
functions of preserving accountability and transparency in the manner in
which it conducts its DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies.

We recognize the unique combination the key-signing and TCRs make of broad
participation, transparency and accountability in order to serve the
central function of preserving and enhancing the stability, security and
resilience of the DNS, thus engendering widespread trust.

We would like to congratulate all the stakeholders involved in the KSK
management process on the services since the first KSK signing ceremony
till to date. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the Review of
Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing
Ceremonies. Following consultations with the At Large community along the
questions that was raised, we found that on some issues there was
divergence of views and we have captured both views.

 *1.    * *Is the current TCR model effectively performing its function of
ensuring trust*

*         in the KSK management process?*

The current Trusted Community Representative (TCR) model has been
effectively performing its functions of ensuring trust in the KSK
management process; however, we make the following observations.

The Abbreviation Draft of the Key Signing Ceremony Annotated Scripts, which
provides a permanent trusted record of the Ceremony, does not include a
definition for "EW" when these appear to be sometimes the largest number of
category of people at the Ceremony. The Key Signing Ceremony Annotates
Scripts do not clearly state that there are no other participants
(including Camera person) present apart from those listed.

* 2.    * * Is the current size of the TCR pool appropriate to ensure

*          participation in the ceremonies, while not overburdening the
availability of*

*          specific volunteers?*

There are two different views on this. The first view is that the current
size of the TCR pool is sufficient. The second view suggests that the
current size needs to be expanded to cater for unforeseeable circumstances
(includes but is not limited to terrorist attacks, flight disruptions,
state of emergency, civil war, etc) that could render all 21 TCRs incapable
from attending to their responsibilities. There might be some merit in
expanding the pool and retaining the TCRs whilst rotating them from within
the pool.

* 3.    * *Should there be a minimum level of participation required of a
TCR in order*

*        to be considered to be successfully discharging their duties?*

No comment.

* 4.    * *There is no standard provision to refresh the list of TCRs
except when they*

*         are replaced due to inability to effectively perform their
function. Should*

*         there be a process to renew the pool of TCRs, such as using term
limits or*

*         another rotation mechanism?*

 There are two views on this matter. The first view is that the existing
pool and their indefinite terms are sufficient and that the 21 TCRs are
more than enough to meet possible contingencies that may arise. That there
is no need for process to renew the pool neither of TCRs nor to use term
limits or introduce a rotation mechanism.

The other view is that there is need for term limits as the original TCR
mechanism is silent on the term. Rotation would protect against potential
capture. There are 2.6 billion internet users should indicate that there
are at least sufficient persons in the world who could meet the criteria
for selection. Where there is an assumption of indefinite service as a TCR,
there should be a constant requirement to disclose any and all potential
conflicts of interest to disable the risk of "capture" by any stakeholder
or interest.

* 5.    * *The current model does not compensate TCRs for their services in
order to*

*         ensure their independence from ICANN.*

*                 a.    Should the model of TCRs paying the costs of their
participation be retained?*

*                 b.   Would some form of compensation to offset the
expenses incurred by the TCRs detract from their independence in performing
the role?*

* c.     If you support compensating TCRs for their expenses, are there
requirements or limitations on whom the funding organization should be?*

 There are two divergent views in relation to this. The first view holds
that the current model where TCRs pay the costs should be retained. TCRs
should be cost-neutral for those not supported by firms or other entities
should suffice.  To create another source of travel funds for TCRs is poor
and unwarranted.

 The second view acknowledges the financial burden placed on TCRs. Although
TCRs are volunteers, a system should be set in place that guarantees
independence yet allows them to carry out their duty. A fund should be
managed externally that is independent that can cater for the expenses of
the TCRs.There should be limitations on those who can contribute to this
fund. Any funds or gifts being awarded to the TCR should be promptly and
formally disclosed through appropriate avenues.


 Kind Regards,


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