[NA-Discuss] Fwd: [dnsext] Fwd: SATIN 2011

[Eric Brunner-Williams]

Colleagues,

This was just posted to the IETF DNSEXT WG mailing list (formerly 
known as "namedroppers").

It is of relevance to the subject area, and perhaps the At-Large 
volunteers to, the Joint DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working 
Group (DSSA Working Group).

The overview alone, ending with "All of this makes DNS, once amongst 
the most boring of topics, into one of the more exciting, and this 
workshop into a timely event." is worth a moment's attention.

Eric

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [dnsext] Fwd: SATIN 2011
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2011 07:18:02 -0800
From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver at ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers at ops.ietf.org>
CC: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver at ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>

Others have attempted to post this, but not succeeded due to spam 
filtering.  So if you haven't seen it yet...

==================================================================

Call for Papers:  Securing and Trusting Internet Names, SATIN 2011

==================================================================

When:       Monday 4 & Tuesday 5 April 2011
            Note that IETF 80 is in Prague, Czech Republic, the 
previous week

Where:      National Physical Laboratory (NPL)
            Teddington, London, UK

Timetable:  Submissions due:            Sun 23 Jan 2011, 11:59 PST
            Notification of Acceptance: Wed 23 Feb 2011
            Final Papers Due:           Mon 15 Mar 2011

Overview
========

The domain name system, on which the Internet entirely relies, has
always been inherently insecure. Spoofing of IP source addresses means
that any wide area UDP protocol (such as DNS) can be forged. Cache
poisoning attacks can be made less likely but not prevented altogether.

ISPs, or others who can intercept traffic, can redirect end users to
sites of their choosing. Users can choose (or have forced upon them) DNS
services that suppress access to sites for policy reasons.

DNSSEC, which addresses some of these issues, has been under development
since late last century, but the July 2010 signing of the root (and the
commitment of many top level domains to timetables for deployment)
signal that widespread deployment may finally be coming to pass.

However, even at the current scale of deployment, implementation issues
are creating unexpected levels of traffic, and that's without the bad
guys making any contribution. Meanwhile DNSCURVE is being promoted as a
lightweight method of securing the links to and between name servers,
which addresses some, but by no means all, of the security issues.

DNSSEC is also being seen by some as a distributed, secure, key
distribution system, which could support new applications, or replace
existing mechanisms for establishing trust in the identity of endpoints.
Others merely see it as a way of defeating marketers who want to inject
targeted advertising into browser sessions. But how effective will these
ideas be if we continue with our existing APIs and stub resolvers?

There are significant issues with DNS besides just its integrity. DNS
services can be used to amplify denial-of-service attacks to create very
substantial traffic flows. Malware has also been using the DNS for
rendezvous arrangements, and has avoided countermeasures by exploiting
the DNS system through ``fluxing'' and other techniques.

There are also signs of a ``tragedy of the commons'' as legitimate
companies fill the DNS with large numbers of names, or set low TTLs, to
give a performance ``edge''. Meanwhile, some applications pre-fetch DNS
answers, with little heed to the impact on the infrastructure.

This latter technique raises privacy issues, as indeed does the proposal
to ``leak'' partial identities of requestors who contact recursive
resolvers, with the aim of providing different answers to machines in
different blocks of address space.

All of this makes DNS, once amongst the most boring of topics, into one
of the more exciting, and this workshop into a timely event.

Topics
======

SATIN aims to provide a forum for academic work on the security of the
DNS alongside industry presentations on practical experiences in
providing name services.

The intent is to make this a workshop that will expose the academics
to the real problems that industry is encountering, and to show industry
what academia has to offer them. To improve the flow of information,
presentations will be restricted to 15 minutes with 15 minutes of
general discussion to follow.

Submissions must be made under either an ``academic'' or ``industry'' 
label
(relating entirely to the content rather than the affiliations of any
author), because the two types will be judged by different standards.

Academic work will be viewed as an ``extended abstract'' and should aim to
meet the general standard for acceptance into normal conferences in the
field. However, since this is a workshop, early results and initial
ideas are welcomed.

Industry submissions should be relevant, insightful, and technical, and
should provide information that cannot be gleaned from reading sales
brochures or manuals.

In all cases, real-world operational, implementation, and experimental
results will be preferred, and these results should inform the DNS
protocol development process wherever relevant or possible.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

    Attacks on naming services
    DNSSEC
    DNSCURVE
    Alternative methods of securing name services
    APIs for DNS resolvers
    Using DNS as a platform for other applications
    Denial of service and the DNS
    Malware and the DNS
    DNS caching on the modern Internet
    Privacy and the DNS
    Application behaviour and the DNS
    Security economics of naming services
    Passive DNS
    Operational experience
    Measurement studies
    New threats and challenges

Questions regarding whether a topic would be suitable are welcome and
should be sent to the programme chair, richard.clayton AT npl.co.uk

Workshop Organizers
===================

Programme Chair:
        Richard Clayton             NPL and University of Cambridge

Programme Committee:

        David Dagon                 Georgia Tech
        Ben Laurie                  Google
        Anne-Marie Eklund Löwinder  .SE (The Internet Infrastructure
                                         Foundation)
        Dan Massey                  Colorado State University
        Douglas Maughan             Department of Homeland Security
        Andrew Moore                University of Cambridge
        Jose Nazario                Arbor Networks
        Roberto Perdisci            University of Georgia
        Dave Piscitello             ICANN
        Paul Vixie                  ISC
        Nicholas Weaver             ICSI & UC Berkeley
        Jonathan Williams           NPL

Submissions
===========

All submissions must be in IEEE two column format and no longer than
eight (8) 8.5'' x 11'' pages, including figures, tables, and references.

That means that the text must be set in two columns in 10 point type on
12 point (single-spaced) leading, with the text block being no more than
7.2'' wide by 9.6'' deep. Author names and affiliations should appear on
the title page. The use of LaTeX and the IEEEtrans.cls file to create
submissions is very strongly encouraged:
     http://conferences.npl.co.uk/satin/format.html

Submissions must be submitted in PDF format via the SATIN 2011 website:
     http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=satin2011

Simultaneous submission of the same work to multiple venues, submission
of previously published work, or plagiarism, is dishonest and/or
fraudulent and action may be taken if this occurs. Note, however, that
we expect that many papers accepted for SATIN will eventually be
extended as full papers suitable for presentation at other conferences.

About the National Physical Laboratory
======================================

The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) is one of the UK's leading
science and research facilities. It is a world-leading centre of
excellence in developing and applying the most accurate standards,
science and technology available. NPL occupies a unique position as the
UK's National Measurement Institute and sits at the intersection between
scientific discovery and real world application. Its expertise and
original research have underpinned quality of life, innovation and
competitiveness for UK citizens and business for more than a century.

NPL is collaborating with the University of Cambridge in a three year
programme to develop robust and accurate measurements of Internet
security mechanisms. Measuring and understanding the deployment of
DNSSEC and other trust mechanisms for Internet names is a key part of
this ongoing programme.

More at: http://conferences.npl.co.uk/satin/