[NA-Discuss] A draft text (was: Re: Forward motion on the Egyptian Internet shutdown)

Thompson, Darlene DThompson1 at GOV.NU.CA
Tue Feb 1 16:17:33 UTC 2011


Both texts are good but I think I prefer this one.  I approve of the plain language wording below and a specific call to action.

This, of course, is just my personal opinion.

D

Darlene A. Thompson
CAP Administrator
N-CAP/Department of Education
P.O. Box 1000, Station 910
Iqaluit, NU  X0A 0H0
Phone:  (867) 975-5631
Fax:  (867) 979-5610
dthompson at gov.nu.ca
________________________________________
From: na-discuss-bounces at atlarge-lists.icann.org [na-discuss-bounces at atlarge-lists.icann.org] on behalf of Marc Rotenberg [rotenberg at epic.org]
Sent: Monday, January 31, 2011 9:22 PM
To: Eric Brunner-Williams
Cc: na-discuss at atlarge-lists.icann.org
Subject: Re: [NA-Discuss] A draft text (was: Re: Forward motion on the  Egyptian Internet shutdown)

Another possibility. Also, is there any reason this
could not be open for signature to all ALAC members?

Marc.

----

Dear Chairman Dengate-Thrush and CEO Beckstrom,

We are writing to you regarding the recent developments in Egypt
concerning the Internet. As of this evening, the Noor Group, the
last ISP providing connectivity to Internet users in Egypt, has gone
dark.

As members of the At Large Advisory Advisory Committee, whose
mission is to provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as
they relate to the interests of individual Internet users, we
believe we have an obligation to call to your attention this recent
development and to recommend specific actions.

As the Bylaws of the ICANN make clear, it is a core value that
guides the decisions of actions of ICANN, to preserve and enhance
"the operational stability, reliability, security, and global
interoperability of the Internet."

The recent actions by the Egyptian government threaten this central
mission of ICANN.

Moreover, the decision by a government to suspend the operation of a
communications infrastructure implicates fundamental human rights
set out in the Universal Declaration of Human RIghts and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

It is also clear that significant economic activity is impacted by
the decision to sever Internet connectivity

We therefore urge you to:

(1) Communicate ICANN's concerns to the Egyptian government
    insofar as the government has taken steps that limit
    access to the Internet;

(2) Remind all governments, through the GAC, of the obligations
    to uphold the Core Values of ICANN; and,

(3) Begin the development of technical methods to prevent
    such "outages" in the future, including the deployment of
    secondary servers to promote continuity of service as
    well as DNS stability

We recognize that ICANN has limited competence in the policy realm
and also that the situation that arose in Egypt could arise
elsewhere.

Nonetheless, it is our view that central to the mission of
ICANN is to ensure the operational stability and reliability
of the Internet. When parties take steps that threaten this
interest, ICANN is obligated to respond.

Sincerely,





On Jan 31, 2011, at 7:54 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:

> a draft text
>
> === Text begins ===
>
> Dear Chairman Dengate-Thrush and CEO Beckstrom,
>
> Concerning the Egyptian Internet shutdown, as volunteers participating
> in the North American At Large Regional Organization who have studied
> network policy, we the undersigned believe you have a chance to move
> beyond rhetoric to support the security and stability of the Internet.
> As contributors to the ICANN community, we expect our Chairperson and
> CEO to uphold those values.
>
> As the IESG and the IAB observed in draft-iab-raven, published as RFC
> 2804, accommodating the legal intercept requirements of states in
> network devices would make the system less secure, increase system
> complexity, and the risk of unintended security failure. The
> considered technical judgment was, and remains, that wiretapping, even
> when it is not being exercised, lowers the security of the system.
>
> We believe this concern applies also to accommodating endpoint
> unreachable requirements of states in systems of network devices, as
> well as flow filter and other disruptive technology requirements.
>
> We are also concerned by the possibility of error by national actors
> attempting to interrupt regional routing. The routing alternatives to
> the Alexandria - Suez corridor are simply inadequate to support the
> requirements for Europe - Asia data communications.
>
> In addition to these systemic concerns, the proper concern of the
> entity tasked with the technical coordination of unique endpoint
> identifiers, we have the following further concerns.
>
> Articles 12 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
> pertaining to privacy and freedom of expression, appear to be the
> specific targets of intentional violation by the Egyptian government.
> This should not pass without comment.
>
> Significant regional economic activity relies upon the availability of
>  CityNet (Ramadan City), ECC (6 October City), EgyptNetwork
> (Mansura), and ECC, MEIX, LINKdotNET (Cairo) data centers. The direct
> economic loss due to governmental action is easy to calculate. The
> greater loss of the reputation and competitive ability of these data
> centers, and their operators is harder to calculate, and likely to be
> much greater than N zero revenue days.
>
> However, the economic consequence of abruptly transforming Egypt to a
> sparse 56kb and VSAT connectivity regime extends far beyond the data
> centers and access providers. It is profoundly disruptive of the
> information economy, and of ordinary transaction services. It will
> result in diminished stability and certainty of commodity prices and
> availablities. It will raise the price of bread. It will cause
> hardship, impoverishment, increased morbidity, and mortality, far
> beyond the social identities of "authority" and "counter-authority".
>
> These concerns are not unique to the withdrawal of prefixes at 16:00
> UTC on January 27, and 09:00 UTC on January 28 -- the "Egyptian
> Disconnection". Opportunistic and endemic network partition, rate
> limiting, and filtering are practiced by some governments. The
> practices which directly reduce the security and stability of the
> Internet must not be allowed to pass without comment because they are
> perpetrated by governments.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> the undersigned
>
> === Text ends ===
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