[At-Large] [NA-Discuss] Draft ISPCP Comments on the Mid-point consultation report on ALAC Review

Tue Dec 16 13:15:59 EST 2008

Ross,
I afraid that DNS is a very small part of what @large Internet lead 
users are interested in. They are mainly interested in the Internet 
"at large" engineering, development and deployment they can each and 
individually benefit from.
jfc

At 17:58 16/12/2008, Ross Rader wrote:
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64My strongest advice to the At-large 
>is to not take this bait and
>resist all encroachments to its independence from the SOs. The At-
>large has a very important role in ICANN's structure, a role that must
>be filled lest we lose balance in the structure.
>
>It might be worth pointing out that the ISPC speaks of "equality"
>amongst ICANN's stakeholders, whereas I am referring to "balance"
>between ICANN's stakeholders. Contracted parties and business users
>carry a lot of weight in the ICANN process - it is imperative that
>user voices (direct and indirect) counterbalance that weight.
>
>Once absorbed into the GNSO, that balance is irretrievably lost.
>
>Here is an excerpt from a document that I collaborated on related to
>the earlier Lynn reforms -
>
>There will be some form of membership which will be represent the
>interest of
>domain name registrants, who will also be entitled to seats on the
>Board of
>ICANN;
>- These representatives will in time be directly elected in ways that
>we have not
>yet devised;
>
>We saw this as a key check on the interests of the contracted parties.
>
>Please fight to preserve and enhance this balance.
>
>The rest of the document and background can be found here: 
>http://www.byte.org/heathrow/
>
>Here are the key principles from the document:
>
>Principles that will guide ICANN reform
>
>1. The governance of the DNS should be appropriate and proportionate
>to the
>nature and needs of the DNS. Accordingly, the governance of the DNS
>should not outlast the useful life of the DNS. This result is more
>likely to
>be achieved if governance of the DNS is more responsive to popular
>demand for domain names and a coherent working DNS than to formal
>arrangements among states.
>
>2. Owing to the role of states in the management of country codes, the
>role of
>a central manager of the DNS, such as ICANN, is naturally larger in
>relation to generic TLDs than it is in relation to country codes.
>
>3. Those who wish to participate in the management of the DNS should
>contribute to the funding of it, possibly with some exception for non- profit
>entities.
>
>4. Businesses need a structure that resolves issues quickly. The future
>structure of ICANN or its successor should be tested against this
>criterion.
>This means that rules must specify voters, election procedures, and what
>constitutes a majority suitable to decide an issue. Consensus is not a
>sufficiently precise basis for action. The decisions of stakeholders
>should
>be capable of being enforced or supported by ICANN's Board.
>
>5. Registrants of domain names have a greater claim on the attention of
>ICANN than end users who do not own domain names. The interests of
>domain name registrants and users are broad and varied. ICANN must
>provide a mechanism by which the interests of Registrants are actively
>taken into account.
>
>6. Internet Users who are not registrants, being without a contractual
>link to
>ICANN, have interests that are distinct from those of governments.
>Internet users are affected by whether the symbols they type resolve to
>websites they seek. Some avenue of participation in DNS management,
>apart from registrars themselves, is desirable, and it is appropriate
>that
>they pay for this input in some measure.
>
>
>
>On Dec 16, 2008, at 11:41 AM, Danny Younger wrote:
>
>>The BGC ALAC Review WG has offered discussion points regarding their
>[š]@al thinking on the ALAC.  This is a response to those points.
>š\œÝ\›Z[›ÛÙÞN‚ˆ8 'SPø 'H\ÈHMK\\œÛÛˆYvisory committee to the 
>Board.  2 people
>>from each RALO plus 5 NCAs
>>"At-Large" consists of 110 bodies organized into RALOs; these
>>bodies are termed ALSs (At-Large Structures)
>>"at-large" (lower case) refers to the universe of Internet users.
>Ú[È›Üˆ\ØÝ\ÜÚ[Àn:
>KˆHSPÈ\ÈHÛÛ[Z[™È\œÜÙH[ˆHPÐS"ˆstructure. This
>>continuing purpose has three key elements:
>>o providing advice on policy;
>È›ÝšY[™È[œ] into ICANN operations and structure;
>È\ÙˆPÐS"¸ ™s accountability mechanisms
>TÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆH]S at rge AC can play a useful role in ICANN as
>[ˆYš\ÛÜž@ committee to the Board, just as the other ACs.
>Ü™Ø[€isation
>ˆ‹ˆ]\™ÙHÚÝ[[ˆš[˜Ú\H™HÚ]™[ˆÛÈvoting seats on the
>>ICANN Board
>TÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆThis is totally inappropriate.  None of the other
>>advisory committees have voting seats on the Board.  Advisor
>>committees advise, they do not vote on Board business.
>ËˆHSPø $S(     Å27G'V7GW&R6†÷VÆB&VÖân place for now
>>
>>ISPCP Response:  Not unless it can become useful; otherwise it is a
>>waste of money.  ICANN pours a huge amount of funds into the
>Z[[™È[™@aintenance of the ALAC-RALO-ALS structure and gets
>™@ry little from it.  At-Large prefers to retain its advisory
>Ý]\ËˆYˆ]S\™ÙH\È›ÝÛÚ[™ÈÈ™H[›Û™Y at n making policy,
>>what is its function and why is it in ICANN?  ICANN's sole purpose
>\ÈÈXZÙH[™[™›Ü€ce Internet policy, manage TLDs and support the
>›ÛÝservers.  At-Large participates in none of these activities.
>>Policy is made by the SOs, not by the Board.  Currently the At-Large
>\ÈÛ›H›Û‹]›Ý[™ÈXZ\ÛÛœÈÈthe SOs.
>Y™™XÝ]™[™\ÜÈ[™\XÚ\][Û‚‚‚BâVGV6ting and engaging the ALSs should be 
>an immediate priority;
>ÛÛ\X[˜ÙHÚÝ[™HHÛ™Ù\ˆ\›HÛØ[€£â•55Response:  Engaging the ALSs is a 
>worthwhile goal if ICANN is
>>will derive some benefit in policy making.  Otherwise, this is
>Y\™[H™\XØ][™ÈHXÝ]š]HÙˆTÓÀC (indeed, many of the ALSs
>>are simply ISOC chapters).
>ˆ
>KˆSPÈÚÝ[]™[ÜÝ˜]YÚXÈ[™Ü\˜][Û˜[ans (including
>\™›Ü›X[˜ÙHÜš]\šXH[™ÛÜÝ[™›Ü›X]ion) as part of ICANN's
>>planning process
>ˆTÔÔResponse:  Yes, plans based on measurable objectives.  These
>>objectives should include direct participation in the policy making
>>process through SOs.
>ˆ
>‹ˆ[Ü™H at ffort needs to be put into developing accurate cost models
>>for At Large activity
>>
>>ISPCP Response:  Surely.  Again, budget should be tied to useful
>>accomplishments.  Right now the At-Large is a total waste of money
>because it achieves nothing.
>
>ËˆSPÈÚÝ[™H[˜ÛÝ@raged to make its own choice of tools for
>ÛÛX›Ü˜]@ve work
>ˆTÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆÙ\Z[›H^HÚÝ[]™Hhis freedom as long as
>>the collaborative work process is public and transparent.
>>
>>8. The public comment period should be kept at 30 days except in
>>special circumstances, in which case ALAC may request an extension
>to 45 days
>TÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆ™]Z[š[™ÈHÝ\œ™[Ì comment period is
>>preferable as long as necessary language translation can be done
>>speedily.
>KˆPÐS"€ should strengthen its translation processes
>TÔÔ™@sponse:  Agreed, within reasonable budget constraints.
>>
>>Relationship with other ICANN entities
>ˆLˆHSPÀ is the appropriate organizational channel for the voice
>[™ÛÛ˜Ù\›œÈÙˆH[™]šYX[[\›™]\Ù\ˆ[ˆPÐS"€ processes
>ˆTÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆ]
>H]S\™ÙHÝXÝ\€e, not the advisory
>>committee) could be if it would deign to actually participate in the
>PÐS"ˆ›ØÙ\ÜÈ[œÀtead of just offering advice.
>LKˆÚ[˜ÙHSPÈ\ÈH at ppropriate channel for the voice and concerns
>>of the individual Internet user, it is inappropriate for other ICANN
>>entities to attempt to claim to represent that individual user voice
>TÔÔ™\ÜÛœÙNˆ[ˆ˜XÝH]@Large structure (not the advisory
>>committee) is currently ineffective in representing the individual
>\Ù\ˆvoice.  We recommend that At-Large be reconstituted as a
>ÛÛœÝ]Y[˜ÞH›ÜˆH[™]šYX[\Ù\‹ˆ[ˆ\XÝ[\‹ with regard to
>>the GNSO, we advise that ALAC have voting representation within the
>>non-commercial users stakeholder group.
>L‹ˆ›ØÙ\ÜÙ\È›Üˆ›ÝšY[™ÈYšXÙHon policy should be strengthened
>›ÝÚ][ˆSPÈ›Ü€ the development of policy advice and within SOs
>>for requesting input from ALAC on policy issues
>ˆTÔÔ™\Àponse:  It is inappropriate (not to mention ineffectual)
>›ÜˆH]S\™ÙHÈžHÈ[˜Ý[ÛˆÝ]ÚYHÙˆHÓÀs by providing
>YšXÙKˆ^HÚÝ[[˜Ý[ÛˆÚ][ˆhe SOs as recommended above as
>>a contributing constituency.
>>
>>Summary
>>ICANN needs to redirect its resources to forming an organization
>>that will actively represent the at-large community in the Internet
>>policy-making process. As presently constituted, At-Large does not
>>serve that purpose.
>>The ALAC (the advisory committee) should continue to be represented
>>on the Board by an non-voting liaison, just as the RSSAC and SSAC
>\€e represented.  It should not have a voting seat (much less two!)
>™XØ]\ÙH]ÚÝ[›Ý™H[›Û™Y[ˆH\Àiness conducted by the
>>Board (which is, primarily, the running of the Corporation).
>>The At-Large should not have liaisons to SOs.  Rather it should take
>[ˆXÝ]€e part, as appropriate, in the policy making activities of
>>the SOs.
>‹ËÙÛœÛËšXØ[›‹›Ü™ËÛXZ[[™Ë[\ÝËØ\€chives/ispcp/msg00462.html
>‚‚€£âÒÒÒÒÒÐ£âäÔF—67W0s mailing list
>>NA-Discuss at atlarge-lists.icann.org
>>http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/na-discuss_atlarge-lists.icann.org
>ˆš\Ú]HTSÈÛ›[™H]p://www.naralo.org
>>------
>
>best,
>
>
>Ross Rader
>General Manager, Hover
>t. 416.538.5492
>
>The Easiest Way To Buy and Use Your Domain Names
>http://www.hover.com
>
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>
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