[At-Large] [NA-Discuss] Draft ISPCP Comments on the Mid-point consultation report on ALAC Review
Ross Rader
ross at tucows.com
Tue Dec 16 11:58:32 EST 2008
My strongest advice to the At-large is to not take this bait and
resist all encroachments to its independence from the SOs. The At-
large has a very important role in ICANN's structure, a role that must
be filled lest we lose balance in the structure.
It might be worth pointing out that the ISPC speaks of "equality"
amongst ICANN's stakeholders, whereas I am referring to "balance"
between ICANN's stakeholders. Contracted parties and business users
carry a lot of weight in the ICANN process - it is imperative that
user voices (direct and indirect) counterbalance that weight.
Once absorbed into the GNSO, that balance is irretrievably lost.
Here is an excerpt from a document that I collaborated on related to
the earlier Lynn reforms -
There will be some form of membership which will be represent the
interest of
domain name registrants, who will also be entitled to seats on the
Board of
ICANN;
- These representatives will in time be directly elected in ways that
we have not
yet devised;
We saw this as a key check on the interests of the contracted parties.
Please fight to preserve and enhance this balance.
The rest of the document and background can be found here: http://www.byte.org/heathrow/
Here are the key principles from the document:
Principles that will guide ICANN reform
1. The governance of the DNS should be appropriate and proportionate
to the
nature and needs of the DNS. Accordingly, the governance of the DNS
should not outlast the useful life of the DNS. This result is more
likely to
be achieved if governance of the DNS is more responsive to popular
demand for domain names and a coherent working DNS than to formal
arrangements among states.
2. Owing to the role of states in the management of country codes, the
role of
a central manager of the DNS, such as ICANN, is naturally larger in
relation to generic TLDs than it is in relation to country codes.
3. Those who wish to participate in the management of the DNS should
contribute to the funding of it, possibly with some exception for non-
profit
entities.
4. Businesses need a structure that resolves issues quickly. The future
structure of ICANN or its successor should be tested against this
criterion.
This means that rules must specify voters, election procedures, and what
constitutes a majority suitable to decide an issue. Consensus is not a
sufficiently precise basis for action. The decisions of stakeholders
should
be capable of being enforced or supported by ICANN’s Board.
5. Registrants of domain names have a greater claim on the attention of
ICANN than end users who do not own domain names. The interests of
domain name registrants and users are broad and varied. ICANN must
provide a mechanism by which the interests of Registrants are actively
taken into account.
6. Internet Users who are not registrants, being without a contractual
link to
ICANN, have interests that are distinct from those of governments.
Internet users are affected by whether the symbols they type resolve to
websites they seek. Some avenue of participation in DNS management,
apart from registrars themselves, is desirable, and it is appropriate
that
they pay for this input in some measure.
On Dec 16, 2008, at 11:41 AM, Danny Younger wrote:
> The BGC ALAC Review WG has offered discussion points regarding their
> initial thinking on the ALAC. This is a response to those points.
> First, Terminology:
> “ALAC” is a 15-person advisory committee to the Board. 2 people
> from each RALO plus 5 NCAs
> “At-Large” consists of 110 bodies organized into RALOs; these
> bodies are termed ALSs (At-Large Structures)
> “at-large” (lower case) refers to the universe of Internet users.
>
> Points for discussion:
>
> 1. The ALAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure. This
> continuing purpose has three key elements:
> o providing advice on policy;
> o providing input into ICANN operations and structure;
> o part of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms
> ISPCP Response: The At-Large AC can play a useful role in ICANN as
> an advisory committee to the Board, just as the other ACs.
>
> Organisation
>
> 2. At Large should in principle be given two voting seats on the
> ICANN Board
>
> ISPCP Response: This is totally inappropriate. None of the other
> advisory committees have voting seats on the Board. Advisor
> committees advise, they do not vote on Board business.
>
> 3. The ALAC‐RALO‐ALS structure should remain in place for now
>
> ISPCP Response: Not unless it can become useful; otherwise it is a
> waste of money. ICANN pours a huge amount of funds into the
> building and maintenance of the ALAC-RALO-ALS structure and gets
> very little from it. At-Large prefers to retain its advisory
> status. If At-Large is not going to be involved in making policy,
> what is its function and why is it in ICANN? ICANN’s sole purpose
> is to make and enforce Internet policy, manage TLDs and support the
> root servers. At-Large participates in none of these activities.
> Policy is made by the SOs, not by the Board. Currently the At-Large
> has only non-voting liaisons to the SOs.
>
> Effectiveness and participation
>
> 4. Educating and engaging the ALSs should be an immediate priority;
> compliance should be a longer term goal
>
> ISPCP Response: Engaging the ALSs is a worthwhile goal if ICANN is
> will derive some benefit in policy making. Otherwise, this is
> merely replicating the activity of ISOC (indeed, many of the ALSs
> are simply ISOC chapters).
>
> 5. ALAC should develop strategic and operational plans (including
> performance criteria and cost information) as part of ICANN’s
> planning process
>
> ISPCP Response: Yes, plans based on measurable objectives. These
> objectives should include direct participation in the policy making
> process through SOs.
>
> 6. More effort needs to be put into developing accurate cost models
> for At Large activity
>
> ISPCP Response: Surely. Again, budget should be tied to useful
> accomplishments. Right now the At-Large is a total waste of money
> because it achieves nothing.
>
> 7. ALAC should be encouraged to make its own choice of tools for
> collaborative work
>
> ISPCP Response: Certainly they should have this freedom as long as
> the collaborative work process is public and transparent.
>
> 8. The public comment period should be kept at 30 days except in
> special circumstances, in which case ALAC may request an extension
> to 45 days
>
> ISPCP Response: Retaining the current 30 comment period is
> preferable as long as necessary language translation can be done
> speedily.
>
> 9. ICANN should strengthen its translation processes
>
> ISPCP Response: Agreed, within reasonable budget constraints.
>
> Relationship with other ICANN entities
>
> 10. The ALAC is the appropriate organizational channel for the voice
> and concerns of the individual Internet user in ICANN processes
>
> ISPCP Response: It (the At-Large structure, not the advisory
> committee) could be if it would deign to actually participate in the
> ICANN process instead of just offering advice.
>
> 11. Since ALAC is the appropriate channel for the voice and concerns
> of the individual Internet user, it is inappropriate for other ICANN
> entities to attempt to claim to represent that individual user voice
>
> ISPCP Response: In fact the At-Large structure (not the advisory
> committee) is currently ineffective in representing the individual
> user voice. We recommend that At-Large be reconstituted as a
> constituency for the individual user. In particular, with regard to
> the GNSO, we advise that ALAC have voting representation within the
> non-commercial users stakeholder group.
>
> 12. Processes for providing advice on policy should be strengthened
> both within ALAC for the development of policy advice and within SOs
> for requesting input from ALAC on policy issues
>
> ISPCP Response: It is inappropriate (not to mention ineffectual)
> for the At-Large to try to function outside of the SOs by providing
> advice. They should function within the SOs as recommended above as
> a contributing constituency.
>
> Summary
> ICANN needs to redirect its resources to forming an organization
> that will actively represent the at-large community in the Internet
> policy-making process. As presently constituted, At-Large does not
> serve that purpose.
> The ALAC (the advisory committee) should continue to be represented
> on the Board by an non-voting liaison, just as the RSSAC and SSAC
> are represented. It should not have a voting seat (much less two!)
> because it should not be involved in the business conducted by the
> Board (which is, primarily, the running of the Corporation).
> The At-Large should not have liaisons to SOs. Rather it should take
> an active part, as appropriate, in the policy making activities of
> the SOs.
>
> http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/ispcp/msg00462.html
>
>
>
>
>
> ------
> NA-Discuss mailing list
> NA-Discuss at atlarge-lists.icann.org
> http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/na-discuss_atlarge-lists.icann.org
>
> Visit the NARALO online at http://www.naralo.org
> ------
best,
Ross Rader
General Manager, Hover
t. 416.538.5492
The Easiest Way To Buy and Use Your Domain Names
http://www.hover.com
Check out our blog at: http://stuff.hover.com
Hover on Twitter: http://about.hover.com/twitter
More information about the At-Large
mailing list