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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On Sunday 11 October 2015 06:56 PM,
McTim wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACAaNxgrd-i4Q56QfG+AFEhvh+k14LA-EXku71Gi79OTuiEESg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi Parminder,
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would disagree that the GNSO is captured by the Domain
Services entities.</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
Hi McTim<br>
<br>
If you have read the responses to my initial mail on the subject,
this proposition appears to be almost the official argument from
ALAC for being so lukewarm if not dismissive with regard to the
membership model of ICANN accountability/ oversight.<br>
<br>
I merely pointed to the inconsistency in ALAC agreeing with GNSO
being 'the' key policy making body in the ICANN but when the issue
of an accountability is being discussed raising the commercial
capture issue.<br>
<br>
So you need really to be talking to ALAC leaders on this, not me.<br>
<br>
Parminder <br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACAaNxgrd-i4Q56QfG+AFEhvh+k14LA-EXku71Gi79OTuiEESg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>here is the makeup of the GNSO Council;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://gnso.icann.org/en/about/gnso-council.htm">https://gnso.icann.org/en/about/gnso-council.htm</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>While there are equal numbers of councilors from Contracted
parties and non-commercial parties (and more biz/IP/ISP folks
as well), this does not mean "capture".</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In my experience as a member of a Contracted Parties House,
these folks are interested in the public interest as well as
their own groups interests.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In short, i don't see "capture" as being applicable.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 3:57 AM,
parminder <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net" target="_blank">parminder@itforchange.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <font face="Verdana">Thanks
to all who have engaged with this discussion.<br>
<br>
I will try and pull together my response in a single
email.<br>
<br>
I see two kinds of responses. One, from what I
understand are people who seem to be close to leadership
positions in ALAC, which centre on the argument that a
membership model as currently proposed by the CCWG is
likely to (further?) put ICANN processes in control of
powerful commercial interests, especially of the DN
industry. The second set of responses are from those who
are relatively on the periphery of the ALAC power
structure, or at least seem to like to identify
themselves as so. The main proposition here is: they are
outraged but feel helpless, and have sort of given up.
In any case, for them, the matter may not be of that
great an importance. <br>
<br>
Before I respond to these two kinds of responses, which
appear rather opposed to one another and strange to be
coming from the same group which fact itself suggests
some level of dysfunctionality of the group, I may
summarily observe that one thing that is common to the
two is that they both represent a rather problematic
abdication of responsibility by a group that is
officially the representative of the users and the 'real
Internet community' in the ICANN system. If one is
abdicating, one should do it properly by declaring so
and vacating the space. This abdication however proceeds
without vacating the space. And for people and groups to
both keep occupying the 'representative spaces' and
abdicating responsibility at the same time is a double
whammy that I find very worrisome. More about that
later, but let me first respond separately to the two
kinds of arguments.<br>
<br>
First about the argument that a membership based model
as currently proposed is such that it will lead to
capture of ICANN processes by DN industry related
commercial interests. Very interesting! And I wholly
agree with the spirit behind it.... But my question to
Olivier and Alan, and others who support thier
contention, is simple and straightforward; how do you
then accept the fact that the most important policy work
- as the most political pubic function - that ICANN
does, which is GTLD related policy development, is done
by the same group which you now say is captured by
commercial interests. I havent ever heard you opposing
that fundamental pillar of ICANN - but please do correct
me if I am wrong. (In fact, the biggest screw up under
the influence of commercial interests that the GNSO ever
did which was about allowing 'closed generics' which was
never appropriately opposed by ALAC.)<br>
<br>
Can you please explain how are you fine with the same
group (commercial interests captured, as per you, and I
agree) can undertake domain name policy development, but
it is not ok for that group, in association with ALAC
and GAC (two groups which, whatever their other faults,
certainly serve to balance against commercial
interests), to undertake oversight over the board, which
is supposed to be a role that gets activated only in
exceptional circumstances, and by design is supposed to
just keep people with executive power on their toes
rather than be acting often. Preferably, they never need
to act, as US did not, I mean mostly, which does not
mean that the oversight hang was not there, and not
doing its work. <br>
<br>
Making the question shorter to be clear: How are you ok
with commercial capture of a/the policy making function
in iCANN, but not of the same groups (esp GNSO)
associating with others in an oversight role? <br>
<br>
In any case, if indeed you do think the Board needs
oversight, and it should be by a group that is as
closely representative as possible of the global public
or the Internet community, rather than commercial
interest dominated, lets first agree on these
principles. Do we agree? And then from there arrive at
what we want, and what the ALAC should seek. Since a
membership based model is so much more public (and thus
closer to ownership by the internet community - I mean
the real one) than a board-centric corporate model, we
should certainly be asking for a membership based
structure, but seek a different way of populating that
membership. Let ALAC develop a position on that, and it
is indeed the responsibility of the people in ALAC's
leadership positions to guide ALAC towards such a
position. Representing those who are outside the
relevant power configuration, in this case ordinary
Internet users, is almost a sacred responsibility, and
it does not get fulfilled by opposing proposals that
cause at least some dispersal of power citing obscure,
unsubstantiated, reasons, which simply do not square. <br>
<br>
I myself want a membership structure for ICANN oversight
that goes towards new innovations that can include
ordinary Internet users in some way, as much as
practically possible. The ALAC structure if properly
developed seem the best candidate for it. Lets be bold
and propose what we want to propose, rather than getting
caught in power shenanigans. I am ready to work with you
on this. Let the ALAC community assert itself. It may
look powerless but that is because it has made itself
so... It is in my view the most powerful part of ICANN
if we really look towards and connect to where its power
and legitimacy comes from - the people, rather than
getting bogging down in high power games, and
manipulative handling of those who exercise power, and
repeatedly keep expressing powerlessness... And if not
upto this challenge, vacate the space, say ALAC is
structurally not working - ALAC cannot keep giving the
ICANN system the legitimacy that it professes vis a vis
the global Internet community. <br>
<br>
This already brings me to my reply to the other kind of
responses that my provocation evoked - of helplessness,
desperation and dis-interest. But dear sirs, you are
ocuppying the ALAC space and providing the ICANN system
its most important source of legitimacy. You have the
power, you just do not exercise it. Do you think civil
society groups fighting climate injustice, trade and
intellectual property injustice, disability and gender
injustice, and so on, have a less challanging job than
yours. But I never hear them say things that I hear from
you - we have given up, and even, now mostly see it all
as a some kind of entertainment. This last is almost
blasphemous to say - you are in this on the behalf of
the most powerless in the world, and the work that you
are abdicating involves power dis-balances and the
opportunity to correct them. <br>
<br>
Lastly, those who most surprisingly claim that these
issues are simply not important enough should then tell
others why do they spend time on this area at all... By
default they are legitimising a system, why then they
are doing it. Let people do work they think is
important, and they can usefully contribute to, and
leave the space of representation of the interests of
ordinary Internet users in global Internet governance
regimes to those who consider work in this area as
important from a public interest point of view, and are
ready to take up the needed struggle.<br>
<br>
No personal offence to anyone please, I am making an
entirely general political argument, for reasons that I
consider important enough to devote some of my time to
pursing them. <br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <br>
parminder <br>
<br>
<br>
</font></span></font>
<div>
<div class="h5"><br>
<div>On Sunday 11 October 2015 04:17 AM, Alan
Greenberg wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">Parminder, <br>
<br>
I have been otherwise occupied most of today, and so
others have already replied and given a number of
perspectives. <br>
<br>
Although I am the ALAC Chair, what follows is being
said purely on my own behalf. <br>
<br>
At-Large has been far from aloof in this debate. You
are correct that we have not contributed hundreds of
posts to the mailing list over the last few days,
but I think that speaks more to our self-control
than anything else. We have been very clear in our
formal comments, and we have been very active in the
sub-groups refining the CCWG proposal. <br>
<br>
You are also correct that we have not been among the
"firebrands" who have been advocating more radical
community control over the ICANN Board. This is not
accidental, and there are several reasons for this.
<br>
<br>
1. The position we have taken is not that of a
single person. There has been a large and active
At-Large community involved. The positions we have
arrived at have been hotly debated and refined over
the months. This does not necessarily make them
better than some other position, but I feel strongly
that they do represent the vast majority of those in
our community who have chosen to be involved in this
process. <br>
<br>
2. It is easy to identify specific cases where ICANN
Boards have made what I believe to be poor
decisions. In at lease some cases, they have later
agreed that perhaps some other path should have been
followed, so this is clearly a learning process. The
Board can also be cited for being less diverse and
representative of the entire world or Internet users
than it might be. But from my perspective, thanks
partly to the good work of recent Nominating
Committees, it is far more diverse that some of the
constituent bodies of ICANN. And it is the ONLY body
in ICANN that is charged with protecting the core
mission and values of ICANN as documented in its
Bylaws. As such many of us in At-Large feel that it
SHOULD have the ultimate decision on many issues,
weighing the perspectives of the various other
stakeholders within ICANN. It is an essential
component that adds balance to the multistakeholder
model. <br>
<br>
3. If you look at the people and groups that have
been advocating for complete community control over
the Board, it is illuminating. The vast majority of
those voices are from the US and, in one form or
another, represent powerful commercial stakeholders
who have much at stake related in the Internet
Domain Name System. Is it any surprise that they
want power and control. That does not make them
evil, and many of these people are colleagues and
friends. But it is natural that they will strive to
do what is best for their own communities. Within
At-Large, we have regularly taken the position that,
to paraphrase an old (mis)quote, what is best for
General Motors is not necessarily best for Internet
users. <br>
<br>
Alan <br>
<br>
At 10/10/2015 07:13 AM, parminder wrote: <br>
<blockquote type="cite">I cannot but note with
considerable surprise and disappoinment that when
<br>
everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is
currently hotly <br>
debating the issue of the stand off between the
ICANN board and CCWG on <br>
ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from
the issue.... When this <br>
should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN
structure, as <br>
representing the peripheries, that should be most
bothered by efforts at <br>
concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis
a vis the rights of <br>
the public. <br>
<br>
I have not been able to follow the process
closely, but if I am right <br>
-and please correct me if I am not - even in the
earlier discussions <br>
ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of
structural changes that could <br>
indeed place an effective oversight of the
'community' over the ICANN <br>
board, when as said ALAC is the one group that
should be most keen on <br>
institutionalising such checks over centralisation
of power with the <br>
ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so.
It really intrigues me, <br>
and I am sure I am missing something here. <br>
<br>
Thanks, parminder <br>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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<br>
</blockquote>
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<br>
<br clear="all">
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div class="gmail_signature">Cheers,<br>
<br>
McTim<br>
"A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it
is. A route indicates how we get there." Jon Postel</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
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