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Kaili, the selection of the electors was a long an painful process.
Perhaps it needs to be refined, but this is not the time to do it.
<br><br>
Regardless (andwithout commenting on the merits of your particular
suggestion), one would also have to cover the case where a member of the
ALT were a candidate (or perhaps both tied candidates were).<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
At 16/06/2016 07:00 AM, Kan Kaili wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><font size=2>Hi,<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>I have followed this discussion with interest but also
confussion. It seems to me that different options have different
pros, cons and possible outcomes.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>As a matter of fact, this reminds me of Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem, basically saying that democracy can only go so
far, and may not necessarily lead to a fair outcome acceptable by
everybody. In that case, some degree of "dictatorship" is
warranted. This is why republics are established, as well as why
the presidential race between Bush and Gore was finally decided by the
Supreme Court.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>Thus, in our case, when a tie has appeared, I suggest to
delegate ALT to decide who will represent ALAC at the position.
After all, the ALT is elected by all of us thru a fully democratic
process. Good enough. In the case that even the ALT cannot
decide, the chairperson of ALAC will make the final decision.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>I believe this process is highly executable, and is also
fully democratic to its limit.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>Being the most junior member of ALAC, just expressing some
of my thoughts for your consideration.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=2>Best regards,<br>
Kaili<br>
</font> <br>
<br>
<dl>
<dd>----- Original Message ----- <br>
<dd>From:</b> <a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca">Alan
Greenberg</a> <br>
<dd>To:</b> <a href="mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com">Seun Ojedeji</a> ;
<a href="mailto:tijani.benjemaa@topnet.tn">Tijani BEN JEMAA</a> <br>
<dd>Cc:</b> <a href="mailto:alac@atlarge-lists.icann.org">ALAC Working
List</a> <br>
<dd>Sent:</b> Thursday, June 16, 2016 1:26 AM<br>
<dd>Subject:</b> Re: [ALAC] Explanation of RoP Director voting
alternatives<br><br>
<dd>As I said, I think that option 2 will lead to strategic voting where
the supporters of the leading candidate may vote for the WEAKEST
candidate instead of for their preferred choice (among the two), and I
believe that in the final race, we should have the two strongest
candidates against each other. <br><br>
<dd>You are correct that option 1 brings the leading contestant in, but
option 2 allows the electors who support this candidate to vote (since we
could not exclude them!)<br><br>
<dd>But clearly others have a different views. Makes life
interesting!<br><br>
<dd>Alan<br><br>
<dd>At 15/06/2016 12:22 PM, Seun Ojedeji wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">
<dd>I would agree with Tijani's option as well, for similar reason; I
think it's just fair not to bring the leading contestant in the tie
breaking process between 2 other contestants.<br><br>
<dd>Regards<br><br>
<dd>Regards<br><br>
<dd>Sent from my LG G4<br>
<dd>Kindly excuse brevity and typos<br>
<dd>On 15 Jun 2016 16:59, "Tijani BEN JEMAA"
<<a href="mailto:tijani.benjemaa@topnet.tn">
tijani.benjemaa@topnet.tn</a>> wrote:
<dl>
<dd><font color="#002E7A">Hi Alan,</font><font color="#002E7A">
<dd>My inclination is to option 2. I find it more logical and preserve
the right of the candidate with the best score. I think that the first
vote is done without side consideration, means that each electorate
member will vote for their preferred candidate, and its result is the
more relevant with the electorate choice. So, itâ€ââ„¢s fair to respect
it and keep the candidate with the best score and rerun the vote to break
the tie between the tied candidates.</font>
<dd>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
<dd>Tijani BEN JEMAA
<dd>Executive Director
<dd>Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)
<dd>Phone: <a href="tel:%2B216%2098%20330%20114">+216 98 330 114</a>
<dd>
<a href="tel:%2B216%2052%20385%20114">+216 52 385 114</a>
<dd>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">
<dd>Le 10 juin 2016 Ã 22:22, Alan Greenberg
<<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca">alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>
> a écrit :
<dd>In the Rules of Procedure revision that I sent a few days ago, there
are several options to one of the voting stages in the selection of the
At-Large Director. The RoP revision group did not reach unanimity on
which option to pick (largely because of the deadline required to sent
the revision to the ALAC to allow us to approve the revisions in
Helsinki).<br>
<dd>The options have to do with the reduction of three candidates to two.
In the optimal case, one of the three candidates will have fewer votes
(or first preference votes) and will be dropped, resulting in two
candidates being left. The difficulty arises if the two candidates tie
for last place, but with the leading candidate not receiving an absolute
majority of votes needed to be declared the final winner.<br>
<dd>Option 1: Re-run the entire three-way election, with the hope that
some positions may have changed. This would be done just once. If the
second vote results in a tie for the last position (even if it is not the
same pair as the first time), one of those tied is eliminated based on a
verifiable random selection. The down side of this method is that no one
may alter their vote and we would have to use a random selection.<br>
<dd>Option 2: Have a run-off vote between the two tied candidates. If the
results between the two is tied, a verifiable random selection would be
used to eliminate one of them. The down side of this option is something
called "strategic voting". Those electors who originally voted
for the leading candidate (the one not in this runoff) may not vote for
the person they prefer, but could vote for the one they perceive as
the weakest opponent to their preferred candidate.<br>
<dd>Option 3: There will be no 2nd vote. One of the two tied candidates
will be dropped based on a verifiable random selection.<br>
<dd>Option 4: Use the same STV voting as would be used in the first round
(to narrow the slate down to three). The BigPulse STV system will always
eliminate one candidate, but if it must resort to a random selection, it
would be internal to the voting system and would not be verifiable (ie it
would have to be trusted to have used a truly random selection.<br>
<dd>Since the ALAC will have to decide on a which option to use, it would
be good to begin the discussion now and not wait for
Helsinki.</blockquote><br>
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</dl><br>
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