[ALAC] Explanation of RoP Director voting alternatives

Kan Kaili kankaili at gmail.com
Thu Jun 16 11:00:57 UTC 2016


I have followed this discussion with interest but also confussion.  It seems to me that different options have different pros, cons and possible outcomes.

As a matter of fact, this reminds me of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, basically saying that democracy can only go so far, and may not necessarily lead to a fair outcome acceptable by everybody.  In that case, some degree of "dictatorship" is warranted.  This is why republics are established, as well as why the presidential race between Bush and Gore was finally decided by the Supreme Court.

Thus, in our case, when a tie has appeared, I suggest to delegate ALT to decide who will represent ALAC at the position.  After all, the ALT is elected by all of us thru a fully democratic process.  Good enough.  In the case that even the ALT cannot decide, the chairperson of ALAC will make the final decision.

I believe this process is highly executable, and is also fully democratic to its limit.

Being the most junior member of ALAC, just expressing some of my thoughts for your consideration.

Best regards,

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Alan Greenberg 
  To: Seun Ojedeji ; Tijani BEN JEMAA 
  Cc: ALAC Working List 
  Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2016 1:26 AM
  Subject: Re: [ALAC] Explanation of RoP Director voting alternatives

  As I said, I think that option 2 will lead to strategic voting where the supporters of the leading candidate may vote for the WEAKEST candidate instead of for their preferred choice (among the two), and I believe that in the final race, we should have the two strongest candidates against each other. 

  You are correct that option 1 brings the leading contestant in, but option 2 allows the electors who support this candidate to vote (since we could not exclude them!)

  But clearly others have a different views. Makes life interesting!


  At 15/06/2016 12:22 PM, Seun Ojedeji wrote:

    I would agree with Tijani's option as well, for similar reason; I think it's just fair not to bring the leading contestant in the tie breaking process between 2 other contestants.



    Sent from my LG G4
    Kindly excuse brevity and typos
    On 15 Jun 2016 16:59, "Tijani BEN JEMAA" < tijani.benjemaa at topnet.tn> wrote:

      Hi Alan,

      My inclination is to option 2. I find it more logical and preserve the right of the candidate with the best score. I think that the first vote is done without side consideration, means that each electorate member will vote for their preferred candidate, and its result is the more relevant with the electorate choice. So, it’s fair to respect it and keep the candidate with the best score and rerun the vote to break the tie between the tied candidates.


      Tijani BEN JEMAA

      Executive Director

      Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)

      Phone: +216 98 330 114

                +216 52 385 114


        Le 10 juin 2016 à 22:22, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca > a écrit :

        In the Rules of Procedure revision that I sent a few days ago, there are several options to one of the voting stages in the selection of the At-Large Director. The RoP revision group did not reach unanimity on which option to pick (largely because of the deadline required to sent the revision to the ALAC to allow us to approve the revisions in Helsinki).

        The options have to do with the reduction of three candidates to two. In the optimal case, one of the three candidates will have fewer votes (or first preference votes) and will be dropped, resulting in two candidates being left. The difficulty arises if the two candidates tie for last place, but with the leading candidate not receiving an absolute majority of votes needed to be declared the final winner.

        Option 1: Re-run the entire three-way election, with the hope that some positions may have changed. This would be done just once. If the second vote results in a tie for the last position (even if it is not the same pair as the first time), one of those tied is eliminated based on a verifiable random selection. The down side of this method is that no one may alter their vote and we would have to use a random selection.

        Option 2: Have a run-off vote between the two tied candidates. If the results between the two is tied, a verifiable random selection would be used to eliminate one of them. The down side of this option is something called "strategic voting". Those electors who originally voted for the leading candidate (the one not in this runoff) may not vote for the  person they prefer, but could vote for the one they perceive as the weakest opponent to their preferred candidate.

        Option 3: There will be no 2nd vote. One of the two tied candidates will be dropped based on a verifiable random selection.

        Option 4: Use the same STV voting as would be used in the first round (to narrow the slate down to three). The BigPulse STV system will always eliminate one candidate, but if it must resort to a random selection, it would be internal to the voting system and would not be verifiable (ie it would have to be trusted to have used a truly random selection.

        Since the ALAC will have to decide on a which option to use, it would be good to begin the discussion now and not wait for Helsinki.


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