[ALAC] Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

Alan Greenberg alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Tue Nov 10 14:42:41 UTC 2015


Thanks Kaili,

I would suggest that details at that level do not 
belong in the Bylaws. If the ALAC chooses to 
follow this path, it is part of our own 
processes. However, I would caution that this is 
a decision that should be made on a case by case 
basis. The ALAC gives formal advice to the Board 
relatively infrequesntly. In most cases, such 
decisions are unanimous. If it was not, it would 
likely be a very small minority that would oppose 
(again, using past history). The ALAC would need 
to carefully decide if it wanted to offset its 
"advice" with an opposing view. I'm not saying it 
is not appropriate, just that if we do it, it should be a conscious decision.

On 2/3, in most cases, a vote requiring 2/3 
(referred to as a supermajority) is 2/3 of those 
directors present at the time (and subject to a 
quorum being there). In some cases, such as 
approval of Bylaw changes, what is required is 
the affirmative 2/3 vote of all directors.

Alan


At 10/11/2015 03:22 AM, Kan Kaili wrote:
>Hi, Alan,
>
>Thank you for collecting comments from our ALAC members.
>
>Regarding the statement "The need that each and 
>every Advisory Committee should preserve its own 
>autonomy in its definition of consensus" and 
>"each Advisory Committee has the right to 
>determine its particular definition of consensus", considering:
>
>-- the final decision's responsibility and power rests at the Board;
>
>-- ACs are to provide "advices" instead of 
>instructions nor guidance to the Board;
>
>-- under various definitions of "consensus", the 
>ACs's advices may not be unanimous, implying 
>there may be opinions against such advices which 
>may provide value and may represent opionions 
>of  substantial stakeholders, as well as may 
>provide insight to the Board in the future;
>
>-- in order to provide richer advices to the 
>Board for consideration and decision making,
>
>I suggest to make the follwing modification:
>
>"... each Advisory Committee has the right to 
>determine its particular definition of 
>consensus.  In the case an advice is not made 
>unanimously by the Advisory Committee, opinions 
>against the advice have the right to state such 
>opinions attached to the advice."
>
>Another comment is more of a question and more 
>technical, which maybe because I am new:
>
>The Board has 16 voting members, which means "a 
>vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board" 
>is normally 11 votes or more.  However, after 
>reading thru the Bylaws, I did not find how this 
>2/3 is calculated.  That is, the counting of 
>votes are those physically present at a meeting 
>at the time of voting, or can be casted remotely 
>or by proxy?  Also, in case one or more Board 
>members casted an "absentee" vote, the 2/3 
>majority is calculated according to the total 
>members who casted their votes, or is according 
>to only those who casted a for/against vote, 
>thus discounting absentee votes?  (There are 
>more cases which may further complicate the outcome of calculation.)
>
>Such technical details may well have been 
>addressed somewhere already.  In such a likely 
>case, please kindly discard my above 
>question/comment.  However, my thoughts are, at 
>such a critical time of ICANN's future, we 
>cannot afford to overlook these details.
>
>Thank you.
>
>Best regards,
>Kaili
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>Alan Greenberg
>To: <mailto:alac at atlarge-lists.icann.org>alac
>Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 2:07 AM
>Subject: [ALAC] Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>
>This is a new proposal by Brazil to replace the 
>current Bylaw change to address Stress Test 18. 
>It re-instates the requirement that the Board 
>reject GAC advice by a supermajority, one of the 
>ATRT outcomes that was proposed several months 
>ago. At that time, there was significant push 
>back that increasing the rejection threshhold 
>increased the power of the Board.  Although 
>possible technically correct, in my mind, it 
>would not make a difference, because rejection 
>of GAC advice, in the relatively rare times it 
>has happened, has been nearly or completely unanimous.
>
>This is now accompanied by a much stronger 
>requirement to consider the advice of all ACs including the ALAC.
>
>This may well be a way to bypass the GAC's 
>rejection of the ST18 outcomes and at first glance, I would support it.
>
>Comments?
>
>Alan
>
>
>>To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org"
>>         <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 14:28:46 +0000
>>Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
>>
>>Dear CCWG colleagues,
>>
>>As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has 
>>provided a consensus input with regards to the 
>>bylaw amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the following:
>>
>>"The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped 
>>the GAC to have a better understanding of the 
>>different views on the issue. In assessing the 
>>different rationales presented so far related 
>>to Stress Test 18, the GAC considered:
>>The need that each and every Advisory Committee 
>>ensures that the advice provided is clear and 
>>reflects the consensus view of the Committee;
>>The need that each and every Advisory Committee 
>>should preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus;
>>The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice;
>>The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as 
>>reiterated by the ATRT2, to set the threshold 
>>for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 
>>2/3 majority voting, consistent with the 
>>threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations.
>>In view of the above, having considered 
>>concerns expressed by various parties, the GAC 
>>agreed to further work on the issue of Stress 
>>Test 18, and to submit any further input to the 
>>CCWG taking into account the timelines of the 
>>CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within 
>>the CCWG to finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability."
>>
>>With the aim of addressing the input given by 
>>the GAC in its ICANN 54 communiqué and the 
>>original concerns expressed by the ST18 
>>proponents, I present for your consideration 
>>the following alternative amendments (underlined) in ICANN bylaws.
>>
>>ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>>Section 1. GENERAL
>>“The Board may create one or more Advisory 
>>Committees in addition to those set forth in 
>>this Article. Advisory Committee membership may 
>>consist of Directors only, Directors and 
>>non-directors, or non-directors only, and may 
>>also include non-voting or alternate members. 
>>Advisory Committees shall have no legal 
>>authority to act for ICANN, but shall report 
>>their findings and recommendations to the Board.
>>Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due 
>>deference to advice from Advisory Committees 
>>and where that advice, if not followed, 
>>requires finding mutually agreed solutions for 
>>implementation of that advice, the Advisory 
>>Committee will make every effort to ensure that 
>>the advice provided is clear and reflects the 
>>consensus view of the committee. In this 
>>context, each Advisory Committee has the right 
>>to determine its particular definition of consensus.”
>>
>>ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>>Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
>>Item 1.j
>>“The advice of the Governmental Advisory 
>>Committee on public policy matters shall be 
>>duly taken into account, both in the 
>>formulation and adoption of policies. In the 
>>event that the ICANN Board determines to take 
>>an action that is not consistent with the 
>>Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it 
>>shall so inform the Committee and state the 
>>reasons why it decided not to follow that 
>>advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a GAC 
>>consensus may only be rejected by a vote of 
>>more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board. The 
>>Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN 
>>Board will then try, in good faith and in a 
>>timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.”
>>
>>Kind regards,
>>
>>Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
>>Divisão da Sociedade da Informação
>>Ministério das Relações Exteriores
>>T: +55 61 2030-6609
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
>----------
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